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This essay offers a critical rereading of the Western theological and legal 
doctrine of illegitimacy or bastardy.  The text first traces the Western stigma against 
bastards to the Bible, particularly to the story of Ishmael, the illegitimate son of Abraham 
and Hagar.  It then shows the systematic discrimination against bastards in classic 
canon law and in early modern Anglo-American common law, and the slow amelioration 
of their plight in legal reforms in the United States in the past century.  The author 
concludes that the Western doctrine of illegitimacy is theologically illegitimate and 
suggests a few historically-informed legal remedies, notably adoption, that would help 
mitigate the plight of illegitimates today.  
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Sex has long excited an intimate union between law and religion in the Christian 
West.  Western churches and states have long collaborated in setting private laws to 
define and facilitate licit sex: rules and procedures for sexual etiquette, courtship, and 
betrothal, for marital formation, maintenance, and dissolution, for conjugal duties, debts, 
and desires, for parental roles, rights, and responsibilities, and much more.  Western 
churches and states have also long collaborated in setting criminal laws to police and 
punish illicit sex.  For many centuries, these two powers kept overlapping rolls of sexual 
sin and crime -- adultery and fornication, sodomy and buggery, incest and bestiality, 
bigamy and polygamy, prostitution and pornography, abortion and contraception, and 
more.  They also operated interlocking tribunals to enforce these rules on sex.  The 
church guarded the internal forum through its canons, confessionals, and consistory 
courts.  The state guarded the external forum through its policing, prosecution, and 
punishment of sexual crimes.  To be sure, church and state officials clashed frequently 
over sexual jurisdiction.  And their respective private and criminal laws of sex did 
change a great deal -- dramatically in the fourth, twelfth, and sixteenth centuries.  But 
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for all this rivalry and change, Christianity, and the Hebrew, Greek, and Roman sources 
on which it drew, had a formative influence on Western laws of sex.  
 
Most of these classic laws have now been eclipsed in America by the dramatic 
rise of new public laws and popular customs of sexual liberty.  Courtship, cohabitation, 
betrothal, and marriage are now mostly private sexual contracts with few roles for 
church and state to play and few restrictions on freedoms of entrance, exercise, and 
exit.  Classic crimes of contraception and abortion have been found to violate 
Fourteenth Amendment liberties.  Classic prohibitions on adultery and fornication have 
become dead or discarded letters on most statute books.  Free speech laws protect all 
manner of sexual expression, short of outrageous obscenity.  Constitutional privacy 
laws protect all manner of sexual conduct, short of exploitation of children or abuse of 
others.  Only the classic prohibitions on incest, polygamy, and homosexuality remain on 
most law books -- now the subjects of bitter constitutional battles and culture wars.  
 
One tender sexual subject has hovered perennially on the margins of law and 
religion scholarship and on the boundaries of criminal, private, and public law.  That is 
the subject of illegitimacy or bastardy.  In the Western tradition, the bastard was defined 
as a child born out of lawful wedlock -- a product of fornication, adultery, concubinage, 
incest, or other sexual crime and sin.  A bastard was at once a child of no one (filius 
nullius) and a child of everyone (filius populi) -- born without name and without home, 
the perennial object of both pity and scorn, charity and abuse, romance and ribaldry.  
Absent successful legitimation, bastards bore the permanent stigma of their sinful and 
criminal conception, signaled on certificates of baptism, confirmation, marriage, and 
death.  They lived in a sort of legal limbo -- with some claims to charity and support but 
with severely truncated rights to inherit or devise property, to hold high clerical, political, 
or military office, to sue or testify in certain courts, and more.  These formal legal 
disabilities on bastards were often compounded by chronic poverty, neglect, and abuse 
-- assuming that they escaped the not uncommon historical practice of being secretly 
smothered or exposed upon birth, or put out to nurse or lease with modest odds of 
survival (Jackson 1996; James 1957; Rose 1986; Thomas 1972).  
 
Illegitimacy doctrine has been a common feature of most legal and religious 
traditions of the world. It has long been part of a common effort to regulate the scope of 
the paterfamilias’ power and responsibility within the household, and to regularize 
inheritance of property, title, lineage, and (in some cultures) control of the household 
religion or the family’s ancestral rites (Ayer 1902; Hartley 1975; Laslett et al. 1980; 
Malinowski 1962). 
   
In the Western tradition, illegitimacy was given special support by Christian 
theology.  Illegitimacy doctrine was a natural concomitant of the church’s attempts to 
shore up marriage as the only licit forum for sex and procreation.  Illegitimacy doctrine 
was also viewed as an apt illustration and application of the biblical adage that “the sins 
of the fathers [and mothers] shall be visited upon their children” (Ex. 20:5, 34:7; Num. 
14:18; Deut 5:9 RSV).  The Bible itself seemed to condone this reading in its story of 
Ishmael, the illegitimate son of Abraham who was condemned already in the womb as a 
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“wild man” and was ultimately cast out of his home with minimal prospects of survival.  
Later biblical laws banned bastards and their seed from the house of the Lord if not from 
the community altogether.  The New Testament equated bastards with those stubborn 
souls who refused to accept the life and liberty of the Gospel.  Christian theologians and 
jurists alike found in these biblical passages ample new legitimacy for the doctrine of 
illegitimacy.  The doctrine found a prominent place in canon law, civil law, and common 
law alike from the twelfth to the twentieth centuries.   
 
Illegitimacy doctrine, however, runs counter to a number of standard criminal law 
doctrines that Christian theology also helped to cultivate (Brennan 2002).  Illegitimacy is 
an unusual kind of status offense that, by definition, forgoes required proof of actus 
reus, mens rea, and causation.  Illegitimacy doctrine is an unusual form of deterrence 
that threatens harm to an innocent third party in order to dissuade a couple from 
committing various sexual crimes.  And illegitimacy is a peculiar species of vicarious 
liability, a sort of respondeat inferior doctrine that imposes upon innocent children some 
of the costs of their parents' extra-marital experimentation. 
 
To be sure, a good deal of the classic law of illegitimacy is now falling aside in 
the United States.  Most states have removed the most chronic disabilities on the 
illegitimate’s rights to property, support, and standing.  Several remaining legal 
disabilities on illegitimates have been struck down since 1968 as violations of the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.   
 
But what the Fourteenth Amendment gives with one clause it takes back with 
another.  The Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause does spare illegitimates 
from vicarious liability for their parents’ extra-marital experimentation.  But the 
Fourteenth Amendment due process clause spares sexually active adults criminal 
liability for engaging in extra-marital experimentation.  With the legal stigma of both 
illegitimacy and promiscuity removed, it is perhaps no accident that illegitimacy rates in 
this country have soared.  While illegitimate children no longer suffer many formal legal 
disabilities, they continue to suffer ample social disabilities in the form of higher rates of 
poverty and poor education, deprivation and child abuse, juvenile delinquency and 
criminal conduct.  Moreover, I shall argue, a new species of in utero illegitimates has 
emerged in the past three decades, condemned even more severely by the very same 
Fourteenth Amendment that protects the rights of their mothers.   
 
This little essay offers some preliminary research and reflection on the theology 
and law of illegitimacy.  Part I sketches a bit of the biblical context and sanction for this 
doctrine.  Part II summarizes the classic canon law and common law on the subject, 
and some of the recent legal reforms in the United States.  Part III offers some critical 
theological reflections on the doctrine of illegitimacy, and suggests a few historically 
informed remedies that might be applied to better the plight of the illegitimate today.  
 
 
BIBLICAL SOURCES AND SANCTIONS OF ILLEGITIMACY 
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The Christian doctrine of illegitimacy was born in the biblical story of Ishmael, the 
bastard son of the great patriarch Abraham.  The facts, as recorded in the first book of 
the Hebrew Bible, are these: At 75-years old, Abraham, a rich and powerful man, grew 
concerned about his lineage and legacy.  He complained to God that he and his wife 
Sarah were without child.  God promised him an heir and countless descendents (Gen. 
15:1-6).  But for ten years thereafter, he had no children (Gen. 16:3, 16).  A concerned 
Sarah urged Abraham to take her slave maid Hagar as a concubine, and have children 
by her.  Abraham obliged.  Hagar conceived.  Newly pregnant, Hagar “looked with 
contempt” upon Sarah, her barren mistress (Gen. 16:4).  Sarah was livid.  She dealt 
harshly with Hagar who fled.   
 
An angel enjoined Hagar to return.  The angel promised that her child would 
survive and indeed have many descendents.  But the angel also spoke ominously of the 
bane that would befall her bastard child: “Behold, you are with child, and shall bear a 
son; you shall call his name Ishmael [meaning “God hears”]; because the Lord has 
given heed to your affliction.  [But] [h]e shall be a wild ass of a man, his hand [will be] 
against every man and every man’s hand against him; and he shall dwell over against 
all his kinsmen” (Gen. 16:11-12 RSV). 
 
Ishmael was born and raised in Abraham’s household.  Abraham embraced him 
as his first-born son, and circumcised him to signify him as one of God’s own (Gen. 
17:23).  Fifteen years later, however, Abraham and Sarah were miraculously blessed 
with the birth of their own son Isaac (Gen. 17:1, 21:5).  Sarah grew jealous of the 
adolescent Ishmael playing with her newly weaned son Isaac.  She grew concerned 
about Isaac’s claims to Abraham’s vast wealth.  “Cast out this slave woman with her 
son,” she enjoined Abraham; “for the son of this slave woman will not be heir with my 
son Isaac” (Gen. 21:8-10 RSV).  After anguished reflection and prayer, Abraham 
obliged Sarah, contrary to his own affection for Ishmael and to the custom of the day 
that a master care for his slaves and their children, however conceived.   
 
Abraham sent Hagar and Ishmael away into the desert, meagerly armed with 
food and water.  Their provisions ran out.  Ishmael grew weak.  His mother cast him 
under a bush, walked away, and sat with her back to him, not wishing to hear or see 
him die.  Ishmael cried.  The angel returned to Hagar, his mother, and proclaimed: “Fear 
not; for God has heard the voice of the lad where he is.  Arise, lift up the lad, and hold 
him fast with your hand; for I will make him a great nation” (Gen. 21:17-18 RSV).  
Miraculously, Hagar found a water well and saved Ishmael.  Ishmael grew up to be a 
skilled huntsman and warrior.  His mother later found him a wife from among her kin.  
Ishmael fathered twelve (legitimate) sons who became princes of the tribes of the 
ancient Middle East (Gen. 25:12-18; cf. Gal. 4:24-25).  He received no inheritance, but 
joined his half-brother Isaac in burying their father Abraham (Gen. 25:9).  Ishmael lived 
a full life and died at 137 years (Gen. 25:17).  Thus far the facts as reported in the Book 
of Genesis.  
 
The ambiguous moral lessons of this story of Ishmael are echoed later in the 
Christian Bible and Apocrypha.  On the one hand, both the Old and New Testaments 
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describe God as One who hears the cries and tends the needs of the “poor” and 
“fatherless,” just as he heard and tended Ishmael.  God’s people are repeatedly 
enjoined to do likewise for the bastards and orphans in their midst (Ps. 68:2; Job 29:12; 
Is. 1:17; Jer. 5:28; James 1:27). 
 
But these quiet biblical refrains on charity are almost drowned out by the robust 
biblical orchestrations denouncing bastards and bastardy.  The Mosaic law precluded 
illegitimates and their progeny from the priesthood, if not from corporate worship 
altogether: “No bastard (mamzer) shall enter the assembly of the Lord,” Deuteronomy 
provides; “even to the tenth generation none of his descendents shall enter the 
assembly of the Lord” (Deut. 23:2 RSV). The Prophet Hosea condemned the children of 
the adulteress: “Upon her children also I will have no pity, because they are the chidren 
of harlotry.  For their mother has played the harlot; she that conceived them has acted 
shamefully” (Hosea 2:4-5). The Book of Ecclesiasticus imposed on the children of the 
adulteress vicarious liability for the sins of their mother: “She herself will be brought 
before the assembly, and punishment will fall on her children.  Her children will not take 
root, and her branches will not bear fruit.  She will leave her memory for a curse, and 
her disgrace will not be blotted out” (Sirach 23:24-26 RSV).  The Wisdom of Solomon 
struck an even more threatening tone for illegitimates: “[C]hildren of adulterers will not 
come to maturity, and the offspring of an unlawful union will perish.  Even if they live 
long they will be held of no account, and finally their old age will be without honor.... For 
children born of unlawful unions are witnesses of evil against their parents when God 
examines them” (Wisd. 3:16-17, 4:6 RSV). 
 
The New Testament went further and labeled as bastards (nothos) all those who 
reject the Gospel’s promise of Christian freedom from the law and sin.  The legitimate 
children of Abraham are those who accept the Gospel.  The illegitimate children of 
Abraham are those who stubbornly cling to the Law, notably the Jews (John 8:31-59; 
Heb. 12:8).  Legitimates are free Christians whose lives are filled with promise.  
Bastards are enslaved non-Christians whose lives are without hope -- and who 
accordingly live as the “wild man” Ishmael and need to be curtailed if not cast out.  St. 
Paul captured this new variation on the Ishmael story in a jarring message to the new 
Christians in Galatia who insisted on continued adherence to the Mosaic law:   
 
Tell me, you who desire to be under law, do you not hear the law?  For it is 
written that Abraham had two sons, one by a slave [Hagar], one by a free woman 
[Sarah].  But the son of the slave was born according to the flesh, the son of the 
free woman through promise.  Now this is an allegory: these women are two 
covenants.  One is from Mt. Sinai, bearing children for slavery; she is Hagar.  
Now Hagar is Mt. Sinai in Arabia; she corresponds with the present Jerusalem, 
for she is in slavery with her children.  But the Jerusalem above is free.... Now 
we, brethren, like Isaac, are children of promise.  But as at that time he who was 
born according to the flesh persecuted him who was born according to the Spirit, 
so it is now.  But what does the Scripture say.  “Cast out the slave and her son; 
for the son of the slave will not inherit with the son of the free woman.”  So, 
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brethren, we are not children of the slave, but of the free woman (Gal. 4:21-31 
RSV). 
 
This passage would become a locus classicus for all manner of later Christian 
theories and practices of illegitimacy, as well as antisemitism. 
 
 
A PRIMER ON THE WESTERN LAW OF ILLEGITIMACY 
While the Western Christian doctrine of illegitimacy was born in the Bible, it was 
raised in Christian theology and jurisprudence. The juxtaposed biblical passages on 
illegitimacy have inspired nearly two millennia of biblical commentaries, and their moral 
judgments have passed into the canon law of the church, the civil law of the Continent, 
and the common law of England and America.   
 
Classic Canon Law.  On the one hand, Christian theologians and jurists have 
long sought to heed the cries of the Ishmaels of the world and to offer them comfort, 
charity, and kindness (Boswell 1988).  For example, the early church fathers and church 
councils condemned the classic Roman law that gave the paterfamilias the power of life 
and death over his offspring, and that paid little heed to the smothering and 
abandonment of bastards born in his household -- practices which later Christian 
emperors outlawed, at least with respect to children of wives and concubines.  By the 
fifth century, the church’s canon law grouped bastards with widows, orphans, and the 
poor as those personae miserabiles who deserved special care and charity from the 
church (Tierney 1959; Courveur 1961).  By the twelfth century, bastards were given 
special standing in church courts to sue for paternal support from indifferent or 
recalcitrant fathers (Helmholz 1969, 1977).  Bastards were also common oblates in 
medieval Catholic monasteries, ecclesiastical guilds, foundling houses, and cathedral 
schools (Boswell 1988).  From the sixteenth century onward, they were also among 
those especially eligible for gratis matriculation in Protestant schools and guilds where 
they received room, board, education, and vocational training (Witte 2002).   
 
On the other hand, Christian theologians and moralists treated illegitimacy as a 
particularly good case for effectuating the biblical maxim that “the sins of the fathers 
[and mothers] shall be visited upon their children.”  The sins of Abraham were adultery 
and concubinage.  The sins of Sarah were contempt for God’s promises, complicity in 
Abraham’s adultery, as well as  jealousy, cruelty, and greed.  Ishmael bore vicarious 
liability for both parents' sins.  There were many sins like those of Abraham and Sarah 
that should be treated comparably when they produced illegitimate fruit, medieval 
writers insisted.  These included: (1) bodily sins, such as fornication, concubinage, 
prostitution, and incest; (2) faithless sins, such as breaches of vows of abstinence, 
chastity, betrothal, or marriage; or (3) spiritual sins of marrying one outside the faith or 
in violation of the church’s rules for marital formation.  Children born of all such sins 
were presumptively the new Ishmaels of the world, and presumptively subject to the 
same stigma and disabilities imposed on the Ishmael of old (Schmugge 1994). 
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The church refined its law of bastardy as it refined its law of marriage.  The 
formative era was the twelfth through fifteenth centuries when the church reached the 
height of its political and legal power, and established church courts through Western 
Christendom to implement its new laws, called canon laws (Brundage 1987; Mackin 
1982).  In this formative period, the canon law came to treat marriage systematically as 
at once a natural, contractual, and spiritual institution, created by God to produce 
children, to foster faithfulness among spouses, and to sanctify the couple, their children, 
and the broader Christian community.  As a natural association, marriage was created 
by God to enable man and woman to "be fruitful and multiply" and to raise children 
together in the service and love of God.  Since the fall into sin, this natural association 
also became a remedy for lust, a channel to direct one's natural passion to proper 
service.  As a contract, marriage was a binding contractual unit, formed by the mutual 
consent of the parties.  This contract prescribed for couples a life-long relation of love, 
service, and devotion to each other and to their natural children.  As a sacrament, 
marriage symbolized the eternal union between Christ and His Church.  Participation in 
this sacrament conferred sanctifying grace upon the couple and their children.  Christian 
couples could perform this sacrament privately, provided they were capable of marriage 
and complied with the rules for marriage formation.  Once properly formed, a Christian 
marital union was indissoluble, as much as Christ’s bond to his Church remains 
indissoluble.  Children born of such Christian unions were the saints of the next 
generation, to be baptized, catechized, and confirmed in the Christian church, and 
nurtured, educated, and socialized in the Christian home (Witte 1997).     
 
The canon law of illegitimacy was grounded in this understanding of marriage.  
Marriage was the proper and licit place for a Christian to pursue sex and procreation.  
Sexual intercourse outside of marriage was a serious crime and sin.  The natural father 
and mother were best suited by nature to care for their own children, and in turn to be 
cared for by them when they grew old and weak.  Unnatural relations between parents 
and children often would not endure nor produce the enduring mutual care that was 
essential to stable domestic welfare.  Blood ties between parents and children were an 
essential natural foundation for an enduring Christian family. 
 
From these premises, the canon lawyers created a hierarchy of illegitimate 
children (Généstal 1905; Helmholz 1969; Schmugge 1994).  The first and least 
stigmatized class consisted of “natural illegitimates” born of concubinage or prenuptial 
sex between fiancées, or, somewhat worse, born of fornication or prostitution by their 
parents.  These children could be legitimated by the subsequent marriage of their 
parents -- though their parents could face severe sanctions for their sexual sin, 
particularly if they were recidivists.   
 
The second class was those “unnatural illegitimates” born of the innocent sexual 
crimes of their parents.  These were usually children born of a Christian couple who had 
married in good faith, then had sex and children, but later discovered a blood or family 
tie between them that rendered their marriage incestuous.  Such children could be 
legitimated if the impediment to their parents’ marriage was dispensed.   
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The third, and worst off, class were “unnatural” illegitimates born to parents who 
had knowingly committed incest or adultery.  Such children were permanently 
condemned to illegitimacy because they were born “not only against the positive law, 
but against the express natural law” (Aquinas 1948 5:2812).  Their parents could never 
marry, given the continued ties of incest between them or the prior indissoluble 
marriage that their adultery had betrayed.  Also irredeemable from bastardy were 
children born of bigamy or breached oaths of chastity or celibacy.  In each of these 
cases, one or both parents had precontracted to another marriage or to a life of chastity.  
Such parents, too, could never be married and thereby legitimate their now illegitimate 
children.  For, having made one set of unbreakable vows, they could not make another 
in a new marriage.  Their children were permanently condemned as bastards. 
 
At canon law, bastards were generally barred from the church’s higher religious 
orders and offices, in emulation of the Deuteronomic law.  In firmer decades and 
dioceses, bastards were also barred from sexual and marital relations, so that their 
dishonorable seed would die out as Ecclesiasticus and Wisdom had foretold.  Canon 
law did allow for a child’s legitimation through papal dispensation, but this was a rare 
prize reserved principally for well-heeled and well-connected royals and aristocrats 
(Brundage 1987; Schmugge 1994).   
 
The canon law rejected the law of adoption practiced in classical Rome and in 
some civil law countries throughout the medieval and early modern periods.  Formal 
adoption allowed charitable or childless couples to legitimate unwanted children, to 
nurture and educate them, and then pass to them their property by gift or testament.  
Adoption found no place in the canon law after the twelfth century.  Fosterparenting and 
grandparenting were well known at canon law, but absent a paternal blood tie, such 
wards remained  illegitimate (James 1857).   
 
Classic Common Law.  A parallel law of illegitimacy emerged at English 
common law.  The canon law dealt with spiritual sanctions for the sexual sin of the 
parents and the pastoral care and control of their illegitimate child.  The common law 
dealt with criminal punishment of the parents’ sexual crime and the civil status and 
sanctions of their illegitimate child.  Before the sixteenth century, these two laws of 
illegitimacy remained separate -- jealously so in cases involving paternity and paternal 
property disputes. After the sixteenth-century Protestant Reformation, the two laws of 
illegitimacy began to merge slowly in England.  Much of the canon law on the subject 
was ultimately absorbed into the early modern common law.  It was the merged system 
taught by the English common lawyers that came to prevail in the American colonies 
and the young American states, often amply adapted to local conditions and customs.   
 
At classic common law, a child was considered illegitimate if “born out of lawful 
wedlock.”  Illegitimate were children born where there was no wedlock altogether -- 
products of the crimes of fornication (filii), concubinage (spurii), prostitution (mamzeres), 
or adultery (nothi) (Brydall 1703).  Illegitimate, too, were children born of putative 
marriages that were subsequently found to be unlawful and were annulled by reason of 
innocent or knowing bigamy or intentional incest (Bacon 1798; Adair 1996).  Both 
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English and American common law dropped the category of illegitimates born of 
breached vows of chastity or celibacy.  American common law added a category of 
illegitimates born of miscegenation. 
 
The common law, like the canon law, devised endless subclassifications among 
these illegitimate children.  The most important distinctions turned on the severity of the 
sexual crime of the parents.  Children born of adultery, or of intentional incest or bigamy 
(and, in America before 1865, miscegenation) were the worst off, for these children 
were products of serious felonies.  They faced the most stringent treatment, and their 
parents faced criminal sanctions of fine, imprisonment, banishment, and, in serious 
cases of recidivism, execution.  Common law, like canon law, rejected the civil law of 
adoption as a means of legitimating one’s own or another’s illegitimate children (James 
1857; Zainaldin 1979).  At the same time, common law made escape from bastardy 
nearly impossible, save through procurement of a private act of Parliament or, in 
America, of the state legislature. 
 
The common law diverged from the canon law at two crucial points, however, 
both to the further detriment of the bastard.  First, at canon law, the post hoc marriage 
of the parents of a “natural illegitimate” child automatically legitimated the child, 
rendering it subject to its father’s support, protection, authority, education, and 
inheritance (Helmholz 1969; Bacon 1798).  At common law, no such legitimation could 
occur.  A child born before his parents married remained illegitimate even if his parents 
subsequently married (Blackstone 1884). “Shotgun” weddings between conception and 
birth legitimated the child, but   post-birth weddings were of no avail.   
 
Second, at canon law, illegitimate children could sue in church courts for the 
support of their mothers and fathers, particularly if the parents were well heeled.  At 
common law, illegitimate children had no right to their parents’ support, and their 
parents had no duty to deliver the same (Kent 1827; Burn 1797).  This harsh common 
law rule was slowly changed by the new English poor law of 1576 that empowered local 
justices of the peace to compel parents to support their illegitimate children who lived in 
the local parish and were dependent upon the parish church’s charity (Helmholz 1977).  
But this English poor law reform was of no use for religious dissenters in England and 
had no place in America.  Indeed, the harsh common law of no parental support for 
bastards persisted in America until well into the twentieth century.  
 
Illegitimate children faced several other disabilities at both English and American 
common law.  Lacking the honor of legitimate birth, they were formally precluded from 
various honorable positions, particularly high political, military, admiralty, and judicial 
offices, as well as service as coroners, jurors, prison wardens, church wardens, parish 
vestryman, or comparable positions of social visibility and responsibility.  However well-
propertied they became, bastards were also often denied access to local polls, clubs, 
schools, learned societies, and licensed professions.  However well qualified they might 
be, they were also formally precluded from ordination in the established Church of 
England (Brydall 1703; Godolphin 1687; Burn 1797).  
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While most of these social disabilities had fallen into desuetude by the turn of the 
nineteenth century, various testamentary disabilities persisted firmly at common law.  As 
a child of everyone (filius populi), the bastard could receive alms and other forms of 
public charity.  But as a “child of no one” (filius nullius), the bastard had no inheritable 
and devisable blood that the common law would recognize.  Bastards could thus inherit 
nothing from parents, siblings, or from anyone else -- whether name, property, title, 
honor, business, license, charter, or other devisable private or public claim or good 
(Blackstone 1884; Kent 1827).  American state laws extended this disability specifically 
to prohibit bastards from claiming wrongful death damages in tort, life or residual 
disability insurance proceeds, social security benefits, military benefits, and other such 
proceeds that were earmarked generically for the children of a deceased or disabled 
parent.  Several states further prohibited or taxed private inter vivos gifts to bastards, 
and denied or impeded their standing in probate courts to sue for legacies from their 
intestate natural parents (Vernier 1938; Clark 1988).   
 
Illegitimate children, in turn, were limited in their capacities to alienate or devise 
their own property.  The estates of childless bastards, or of those who died intestate or 
with defective wills, were seized by officials upon their deaths.  Even those illegitimates 
who donated or devised their property to surviving spouses or children by proper 
instruments were sometimes subject to special gift and inheritance taxes imposed by 
authorities on both sides of the Atlantic (Bacon 1797; Clark 1988). 
 
These common law disabilities on illegitimates were considered necessary to 
protect licit marriage and to deter illicit sex.  It was a commonplace of Anglo-American 
common law until the twentieth century that traditional marriage was a “Godly 
ordinance,” “a sacred obligation,” “a public institution of universal concern,” “the very 
basis of the whole fabric of civilized society” (quoted by Witte 1997:194).  It was an 
equal commonplace that Christianity was a part of the common law, including the 
Bible’s commandments not to commit adultery, fornication, prostitution, incest, and 
other sexual sins and crimes.  Illegitimacy doctrine was part and product of these 
Christian common law beliefs -- a way for the law to symbolize proper family values and 
to scapegoat sexual sin at once.  An Ohio judge put it thus in a 1961 case: “It might 
perhaps be mentioned that the Decalog, which is the basis of our moral code, 
specifically states that the sins of the father may be visited upon the children unto the 
third and fourth generation, so that the argument against making the children suffer for 
the mother’s wrong can be attacked on ethical grounds” (quoted by Krause 1971:9).  
Another authority defended the formal legal disabilities on illegitimates with these words 
in 1939: “The bastard, like the prostitute, thief, and beggar, belongs to that motley crowd 
of disreputable social types which society has generally resented, always endured.  He 
is a living symbol of social irregularity, and undeniable evidence of contramoral forces” 
(quoted by ibid.:1). 
 
Modern American Reforms.  Neither moral stigmatization nor legal disability, 
however, proved enough to deter the conception of illegitimate children.  Illegitimacy 
rates in Europe and America -- while subjects of endless debate among demographers -
- have, by all accounts, risen steadily since the first systematic records were kept in the 
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sixteenth century.  Illegitimacy rates stood at 2-5% in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries in Europe -- with little discernible difference among Catholic and Protestant 
polities, and surprisingly little demonstrable increase when polities raised the age of 
marriage or tightened marriage formation rules (Laslett 1977:102ff; Laslett et al. 1980).  
With growing liberalization, urbanization, and emigration in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, illegitimacy rose to median levels of 5-10% in Europe and 
America, often well over 10% in some of the larger cities (ibid.; Brinton 1936).  These 
rates gradually moved up a percentage point or two from ca. 1850-1950, with larger 
cities and more liberal communities sometimes reaching rates over 15%.   
 
Both the growing numbers of illegitimates and the growing visibility of their 
poverty and exploitation in cities at the turn of the twentieth century led to a growing 
campaign to ameliorate their plight (Reeke 1998).  Especially during and after the New 
Deal, many American states reformed their criminal laws and private laws to give new 
protection to illegitimate (and legitimate) children.  Firm new laws against assault and 
abuse of children offered substantive and procedural protections, particularly for those 
who suffered under intemperate parents and guardians.  New criminal laws punished 
more firmly abortion and infanticide.  Ample new federal and state tax appropriations 
were made available to support orphanages and other children’s charities, and to 
establish new children’s aid and social welfare societies.  Child labor, particularly the 
cruel industrial exploitation of illegitimate children in factories and workhouses, was 
firmly outlawed by both federal and state laws.  Educational opportunities for children 
were substantially enhanced through the expansion of public schools.  The modern 
welfare state came increasingly to stand in loco parentis for needy children, offering 
them care, protection, and nurture, regardless of the legitimacy of their birth (Thomas 
1972; Krause 1971). 
 
Modern states also facilitated the legitimation of children.  Abandoning a 700-
year-old common law rule, many states in the first half of the twentieth century began to 
allow for legitimation of children through the subsequent marriage of their natural 
mother and natural father.  More recently, most states extended this to allow for 
legitimation upon marriage of the natural mother to any man, not necessarily the father 
of the illegitimate children.   
 
Modern states further facilitated legitimation by adopting the ancient doctrine of 
adoption.  Both medieval canon law and early modern common law had firmly rejected 
the Roman and civil law of adoption.  Classic canon law had treated natural blood ties 
between parent and child as essential to the formation of a stable Christian family.  
Classic common law had made blood ties the absolute condition for vesting the father’s 
right and duty to control and support the child and to transfer family property to him or 
her.  This left “unnatural” illegitimates without much prospect for legitimation.  It also left 
childless couples without much hope for perpetuating their name and legacy, unless 




Massachusetts was the first common law jurisdiction to adopt adoption.  An 1851 
statute allowed for the permanent transfer of parental power to a third party adopting 
adult who was biologically unrelated to the child.  And, in turn, it automatically 
legitimated the adopted child as the adopting parent’s own, providing it with a name, 
support, and all the rights and privileges of a legitimate child during and after the 
adopting parent’s lifetime (Zainaldin 1979).  A century later this was the norm 
throughout the United States, as well as in England (Vernier 1938; Clark 1988; James 
1857).  
 
Even where children were not or could not be legitimated, modern states 
removed a good number of the common law disabilities against them.  Most importantly, 
illegitimate children gained firmer standing in courts and surer footing through agencies 
to file paternity suits, and to sue their father for support during his lifetime.  The growing 
presumption now in most states is that a father owes a duty of support to his natural 
children and can be subject to mandatory paternity tests in suspicious cases and 
criminal sanctions in cases for failure to furnish mandated child support.  Moreover, a 
good number of the traditional prohibitions against gifts and devises to illegitimates have 
fallen aside.  In all states, mothers are entirely free to give their illegitimate children 
property by gift or testament.  Illegitimate children, in turn, are freely entitled to receive 
property from mothers who have died testate or intestate.  In most states, this same rule 
applies to inheritance between fathers and illegitimate children, though several states 
still impose restrictions on receipt of such paternal legacies, particularly in cases of the 
father’s intestacy.  Several states also give priority to legitimate children in cases of 
inheriting from grandparents or claiming reversionary or remainder property interests 
(Clark 1988; Abrams & Ramsey 2000), though these traditional preferences, too, are 
falling aside rapidly.  
 
The plight of illegitimate children has been still further relieved through recent 
United States Supreme Court interpretations of the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment (and, in federal cases the equal protection reading of the Fifth 
Amendment due process clause).  In nearly two dozen cases since 1968, the Court has 
slowly drawn much of the remaining sting and stigma from illegitimacy -- though the 
formal legal category of illegitimacy still remains licit under the equal protection clause.  
Illegitimate children are now equally entitled with legitimate children to recover tort 
damages or workman’s compensation benefits for the wrongful death of their parents.  
They are equally entitled to make claims on the properties and estates of their fathers.  
They are equally entitled to draw residual social security benefits, residual disability 
benefits, and life insurance proceeds from their deceased parents (Clark 1988; Zingo & 
Early 1994; Abrams & Ramsey 2000).   
 
There is ample irony in the protection afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment, 
however.  The Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause does remove much of 
the legal stigma from illegitimate birth.  But the Fourteenth Amendment due process 
clause removes most of the legal sanction from extra-marital sex.  With the ill legal 
consequences of both illegitimacy and promiscuity largely removed, the number of 
illegitimates has exploded.  In the past two decades, nearly one-third of all American 
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children -- and more than one-half of all African-American children -- were born 
illegitimate (Abrahamson 1998; Popenoe and Whitehead 1998-2000; Blankenhorn 
1995).  While many of these children thrive in single, blended, and adoptive households, 
a good number more do not.  Illegitimate children still suffer roughly three times the 
rates of poverty and penury, poor education and health care, juvenile delinquency and 
truancy, criminal conduct and conviction when compared to their legitimate peers.  
Illegitimate children and their mothers also drew considerably more heavily upon federal 
and state welfare programs, with all the stigmatizing by self and others that such 
dependence often induces (ibid; Reeke 1998; Hendrix 1998; Zingo & Early 1994).  
While the legal and moral stigma of illegitimacy may no longer sting much, the social 
and psychological burdens of illegitimacy remain rather heavy. 
 
There is an even greater irony to the protection afforded by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The extension of its guarantee of sexual liberty to include the right of 
abortion has sanctioned a whole new class of “illegitimates” in the past three decades.  
These new illegitimates are not those unwanted innocents who are born out of wedlock, 
but those unwanted innocents who are aborted before their birth.  These unwanted 
innocents pay not with a sort of a civil death as in the past, but with an actual physical 
death without hope of a future.   
 
This is not to suggest that children conceived out of wedlock are the only or even 
the majority of those being aborted.  Nor is it to say that we must return to a system of 
criminalizing abortion and thus exposing unwanted innocents and their mothers to more 
desperate and dangerous measures.  But I dare say that it is worth pondering the 
analogies between the current plight of the innocent being in utero and the historical 
plight of the innocent youngster in limbo.  Indeed, if the historical doctrine of illegitimacy 
was a Christian theology of original sin pressed to untutored extremes (as I shall argue 
below), this new form of illegitimacy is a constitutional theory of sexual liberty pressed to 




Given the shaping historical influence of Christian theology on the Western law of 
illegitimacy, perhaps it would be useful in conclusion to inquire a bit about what 
contemporary theology can still say about this doctrine and about its further reform.  
 
It must be remembered that, despite all the recent changes in American law and 
culture, many religious communities, within and beyond the Abrahamic tradition, 
continue to maintain a theological doctrine of illegitimacy today.  Some of these religious 
communities continue to predicate this doctrine on explicit theological and moral 
grounds of deterring extramarital sex, maintaining marital sanctity, and supporting the 
natural nuclear family.  Illegitimate children born in these religious communities 
sometimes still continue to bear severe sanctions and disabilities imposed on them by 
internal religious law: indeed “honor killings” of bastards and their mothers have recently 
risen in some religious communities around the world. 
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The First Amendment lawyer in me cannot resist saying a few words about this.  
The free exercise clause mandates that religious communities in this country be left free 
to preach and practice their theology and law of illegitimacy, without undue interference 
from the state.  This corporate free exercise right does not license religious communities 
to threaten or harm the life and limb of any of its members, whether legitimate or 
illegitimate.  Honor killings or anything remotely resembling the same have no place or 
protection.  Nor does the free exercise clause license the community to impede any 
party’s right to leave that religious community if it finds its preaching and practice on 
illegitimacy unacceptable.  But the free exercise clause should protect the religious 
community’s right to preach and practice peaceably against illegitimacy, and to sanction 
and shun illegitimates in their midst up to the point that they threaten or commit violence 
against them.  Neither the voluntary members of that religious community nor anyone 
else should have recourse to state legislatures or courts to enjoin or punish the same.  
Both popular and unpopular religious beliefs and practices deserve constitutional 
protection.  That is the price we pay for religious freedom for all.  
 
Theological Critique. The amateur theologian in me, however, cannot resist 
saying a few more words to challenge the traditional Christian doctrine of illegitimacy, 
which many conservative Christian churches still teach today.  In my view, the Christian 
theological doctrine of illegitimacy is theologically illegitimate.  It is a misreading of basic 
biblical texts.  It is a misunderstanding of the doctrine of original sin.  It is a missed 
insight into the true meaning and possibility of Christian families.   
 
The biblical story of Abraham and Ishmael is just that -- a story, which must be 
read as part of the full biblical nomos and narrative.  It is a powerful, troubling, and 
sobering tale.  It is, to my mind, best seen as an injunction to faithfulness and patience, 
a warning against concubinage and adultery, a testament to divine mercy and miracle, 
all of which lessons are underscored many times over later in the Bible.  But Abraham’s 
harsh treatment of Ishmael is no more to be emulated and implemented today than the 
later story of Abraham carrying his legitimate son Isaac to the top of mountain to 
sacrifice him on an altar (Gen. 22:1-14).   
 
Illegitimacy doctrine can find no firm anchorage in the familiar biblical adage that 
“the sins of the fathers shall be visited upon their children.”  Four times that passage 
recurs in the Bible.  Twice, it appears in the Decalogue as a gloss on the 
Commandment prohibiting idol worship.  “You shall not make for yourself a graven 
image ... you shall not bow down to them or serve them; for I the Lord your God am a 
jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children of the third and the 
fourth generation of those who hate me, but showing steadfast love to thousands of 
those who love me and keep my commandments” (Ex. 20:4-6 RSV; cf. Deut. 5:8-10).  
The sin at issue is idolatry, not adultery.  And nothing is said here to distinguish among 
legitimate or illegitimate children of the next generations.  The threat of vicarious liability 
is clear for any subsequent generations of children who continue to “hate God” or 
perpetuate idol worship.  But “steadfast love” is promised to those who love God and 
keep his commandments.  Exactly the same promise is repeated in the other two 
passages that repeat this phrase of “visiting iniquity upon children.”  Legitimate or 
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illegitimate children of sinners who perpetuate their parents’ sin are condemned.  But 
those children of sinners who are righteous receive God’s steadfast love (Ex. 34:7; 
Num. 14:18).  These passages do not teach a doctrine of double original sin for 
illegitimates.  They preach the need for all to repent and be righteous. 
 
Later biblical passages support this reading.  In Deuteronomy, for example, 
Moses lays out various laws of crime and tort, and then explicitly rejects the law of 
vicarious liability within the family: “The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, 
nor shall the children be put to death for the fathers; every man shall be put to death for 
his own sin” (Deut. 24:16).  In the next verse he adds: “You shall not pervert the justice 
due to the sojourner or the fatherless” (Deut. 24:17; see also Deut. 27:19; Ps. 94:6; Is. 
9:17; Lam. 5:3). The prophet Ezekial says clearly that in a community dedicated to 
“Godly justice,” children should not bear vicarious liability for their parents’ sin: “You say, 
‘Why should not the son suffer for the iniquity of the father?’  [I say:] When the son has 
done what is lawful and right, and has been careful to observe all my statutes, he shall 
surely live.  The soul that sins shall die.  The son shall not suffer for the iniquity of the 
father, nor the father suffer for the iniquity of the son; the righteousness of the righteous 
shall be upon himself, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon himself” (Ezek. 
18:19-20 RSV; cf. Is. 3:10-11).   
 
This biblical teaching of individual accountability and liability is further 
underscored by New Testament teaching.  If Christ’s atonement for sin means anything 
for Christians, it means that no one, not least unborn or newborn children, need be 
scapegoats for the sins of their parents.  In Christian theology, one Scapegoat for 
others’ sins was enough.  The New Testament says repeatedly that each individual soul 
will stand directly before the judgment seat of God to answer for what he or she has 
done in this life, and to receive final divine judgment and mercy (see esp. Matt. 25:31-
46).  Before the judgment seat of God, there will be no class actions, and no joint or 
vicarious liability for which the individual soul must answer.  
 
Equally exaggerated, in my view, is the conventional theological teaching that 
blood ties are a sine qua non of faithful and stable family life and love.  Kin altruism, of 
course, is an ancient classical insight, which came most famously into Christian 
theology via Thomas Aquinas’s appropriation of Aristotle (Browning et al. 1997).  There 
is something fundamentally sound and sensible in the notion that a parent, particularly a 
father, will be naturally inclined to invest in the care of a child who carries his blood and 
name, who looks and acts like him, and who needs him in those tender years to survive.   
 
But it is easy to press this naturalist argument for kin altruism too far.  After all, 
the same Christian theology that insists on blood ties between parent and child insists 
on no blood ties between husband and wife.  Indeed, to marry within the prohibited 
degrees of consanguinity is to commit the crime of incest, a serious offense if it is done 
with mens rea.  But why should the legitimacy of parental love turn essentially on the 
presence of blood ties, but the legitimacy of marital love turn essentially on the absence 
of blood ties?  The sacrificial love and charity demanded of a parent and a spouse are 
not the same, but they are certainly very comparable, and they must be discharged 
 16 
concurrently.  Why is a blood tie so essential to one and not to the other relationship?   
This strikes me as a peculiar form of social transubstantiation doctrine gone logically 
awry. 
 
This is not to argue, as some do today, that the crime of incest must be dropped 
and that siblings and blood relatives must be left free to marry.  It is instead to argue 
that natural blood ties between parent and child are not essential to stable families.  
Parental love, like marital love, is in its essence not only an instinct but also a virtue, not 
only a bodily inclination but also a spiritual intuition (Jackson 1999).  Blood ties between 
parents and children should not be easily severed.  But parental ties to children should 
not be predicated on blood ties alone.  Real family kinship goes beyond “birth, biology, 
and blood” (Post 2000: 124).  Adoption of children is an option that must always be 
considered by some and applauded by all.  
 
Adoption still remains a theologically tender topic today.  Until a few generations 
ago, it was still forbidden or least severely frowned on in many Christian quarters (Post 
2000).  But adoption is one of the deepest forms and examples of Christian charity.  A 
Christian need only look so far as the example of the first Christian family: Joseph, after 
all, adopted Jesus, the purportedly illegitimate child of Mary, and raised him in a stable 
family despite the absence of a blood tie to him (Schaberg 1987).  A Christian might 
further look at how the New Testament describes God’s mechanism for dispensing 
grace: Christians are adopted as heirs of salvation, despite the sins that they inherit 
(Rom. 8:15, 23, 9:4; Gal. 4:5; Eph. 1:5).  That is the real point of Paul’s jarring passage 
to the Galatians that we saw earlier.  Adoption by grace is the theological means by 
which God removes the stigma of sin and the punishment it deserves.   
 
Legal Implications. To castigate the traditional doctrine of illegitimacy, however, 
does nothing to ameliorate the current plight of outcast children.  If theology no longer 
should support a doctrine of illegitimacy, and the law no longer should stigmatize the 
incidence of illegitimacy, what can be done about the current problem of so many 
children born out of wedlock, with all the predictions of social pathos and problems, 
dependency and delinquency that await them?  The ancient angel’s description of 
Ishmael’s bane still seems altogether too apt a prediction of the plight of the modern 
illegitimate: “He will be a wild ass of a man, his hand will be against every man and 
every man’s hand against him; and he shall dwell over against all his kinsmen.”  
 
One obvious legal measure is to assign further responsibility where it is due: on 
both the mother and the father of the unwanted child.  Historically, adulterers, 
fornicators, and other sexual criminals paid dearly for their crimes -- by fine, prison, or 
banishment, by execution in extreme cases.  But this remedy often only exacerbated 
the plight of their illegitimate child, who in extreme cases was now often left with no or 
little natural network of family resources and support.  Today, adulterers and fornicators 
pay little if any for their sexual behavior -- protected in part by new cultural mores and 
constitutional laws of sexual privacy.  Even if one wanted to pursue a neo-Puritan path  
-- I, for one do not! -- it is highly unlikely that a new criminalization of adultery or 
fornication could pass constitutional or cultural muster.    
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But the elimination of criminal punishment for promiscuity should, to my mind, be 
coupled with a much firmer imposition of ongoing civil responsibility for the care and 
support of an innocent child born of such conduct.  After all, the same constitutional text 
that exonerates promiscuity also licenses contraception, which is widely and cheaply 
available now, indeed free in many quarters.  Those who choose to have children out of 
wedlock notwithstanding these options need to pay dearly for their children’s support.  I 
am no fan of shotgun marriages or forced cohabitation of a couple suddenly confronted 
with the prospect of a new child.  But I am a fan of aggressive paternity and maternity 
suits, now amply aided by the growing availability of cheap genetic technology.  I am 
also a fan of firm laws that compel stiff payments of child support for non-custodial 
parents, and that garnish the wages, put liens on the properties, and seek reformation 
of insurance contracts and testamentary instruments of those parents, particularly 
fathers, who choose to ignore their dependent minor children.  I am equally a fan of tort 
suits by illegitimate children who can seek compensatory and punitive damages from 
their parents or their parents’ estates in instances where these children have been 
cavalierly abandoned or notoriously abused.  These and a good number of comparable 
provisions are happily becoming increasingly common in many American states today, 
with several federal laws providing interstate support and enforcement, and criminal law 
standing ready with sanctions when civil orders are chronically breached.   
 
A second obvious legal measure is a much more robust engagement of the 
doctrine of adoption.  For all the pro- and anti-abortion lobbying and litigation that has 
emerged in the post-Roe v. Wade era, there has been relatively little attention paid to 
the alternative of adoption.  Historically, adoption legitimated illegitimate children, 
removing the cultural stigma and civil shadow that attended their birth.  Today, adoption 
provides not only this protection, but also one of the best hopes and remedies to the 
new illegitimates who are condemned in utero.  Adoption should, to my mind, be much 
more aggressively advocated and actively facilitated -- and amply celebrated and 
rewarded when a natural mother chooses to make this heroic sacrifice. 
 
The law of adoption has improved somewhat in recent years, and both state and 
federal laws and appropriations have made it easier and cheaper than in past decades.  
But adoption is still a clumsy and expensive procedure to pursue in this country, and 
thus remains reserved primarily for the substantially well to do.  It is made worse by the 
continued insistence of many states that natural fathers and mothers have an effective 
veto over adoptions -- however irresponsible they may have been in conceiving the 
child and however notorious they may have been in neglecting or abusing it in utero or 
upon birth.  It is too easy to say that blood ties should mean nothing and that children 
should be placed only with the fittest parents.  That is a dangerous step along the way 
to the bleak anonymous pattern of parenting contemplated coldly in Plato’s Republic 
and B.F. Skinner’s Walden Two.  But a more generously funded, administered, and 
applied law of adoption would do much to alleviate the plight of the modern illegitimates. 
 
* * * * 
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Bastards, like the poor, will doubtless always be with us  -- subjects of pity and 
scorn, romance and ribaldry at once.  Bastards may now have passed largely beyond 
the province of religion and criminal law.  But they live on in our language and literature, 
with all the ambivalences of the first story of Ishmael.  Contrast the sound still today of 
the pitying phrase: “Oh, you poor bastard” with the angry retort, “You Damned Bastard!!”  
Read still today of the checkered career of the illegitimate love-child in Hawthorne’s 
Scarlet Letter or Shakespeare’s plays.  Shakespeare’s King Lear perhaps put the 
puzzlement and protest over the illegitimate’s plight best in the words of Edmund, the 
scheming bastard, who nonetheless could speak to the injustice of his status:  
 
Thou, Nature, art my goddess; to thy law 
My services are bound.  Wherefore should I 
Stand in the plague of custom, and permit 
The curiosity of nations to deprive me, 
For that I am some twelve or fourteen moonshines  
Lag of a brother?  Why bastard?  Wherefore base, 
When my dimensions are as well compact, 
My mind as generous, my shape as true, 
As honest madam’s issue?  Why brand they us 
With base?  with baseness?  Bastardy base?  Base? 
Who, in the lusty stealth of nature, take 
More composition and fierce quality 
Than doth within a dull, stale, tired bed, 
Go to th’creating a whole tribe of fops 
Got ‘tween sleep and wake?  Well then 
Legitimate Edgar, I must have your land. 
Our father’s love is to the bastard Edmund 
As to the legitimate.  Fine word “legitimate.” 
Well, my legitimate, if this letter speed, 
And my invention thrive, Edmund the base 
Shall top the legitimate.  I grow.  I prosper. 
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Abrahamson, Mark (1998) Out of Wedlock Birth: The United States in Comparative 
Perspective.  Westport, CT/London: Praeger. 
Abrams, Douglas E. and Sarah H. Ramsey (2000)  Children and the Law: Doctrine, 
Policy, and Practice.  St. Paul, MN: West Group. 
Adair, Richard (1996) Courtship, Illegitimacy and Marriage in Early Modern England.  
Manchester: Manchester University Press.  
Aquinas, Thomas (1948), Summa Theologica, 5 vols., trans. Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province.  Allen, TX: Christian Classics.  
Ayer, John C., Jr. (1902) “Legitimacy and Marriage,” Harvard Law Review 16:22-42. 
Bacon, Matthew (1798) A New Abridgement of the Law, 5th ed., 7 vols. London: A. 
Strathan. 
Blackstone, William (1884) Commentaries on the Law of England, 3d rev. ed., Thomas 
H. Cooley ed.  Chicago: Callaghan and Company.   
Blankenhorn, David (1995) Fatherless America: Confronting our Most Urgent Social 
Problem. New York: Basic Books. 
Boswell, John (1988) The Kindness of Strangers: The Abandonment of Children in 
Western Europe from Late Antiquity to the Renaissance.  New York: Pantheon Books.   
Brinton, Crane (1936) The French Revolutionary Legislation on Illegitimacy.  
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
Browning, Don S. et al. (1997)  From Culture Wars to Common Ground: Religion and 
the American Family Debate.  Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press. 
Brundage, James A. (1987)  Law, Sex, and Christian Society in Medieval Europe. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Brydall, John (1703)  Lex Spuriorum, or the Law Relating to Bastardy. London: Atkins. 
Bumpass, Larry L. (1990) "What's Happening to the Family? Interactions Between 
Demographic and Institutional Change," Demography 27:485.  
Burn, Richard (1797) Ecclesiastical Law, 6th ed., 4 vols. London: A. Strathan. 
Clark, Homer H. (1988) The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States, 2d ed. St. 
Paul, MN: West Publishing Co. 
 20 
Couvreur, Gilles (1961) Les pauvres ont-ils des droits? Rome: Libraria editrice 
dell’Universita Gregoriana.   
Généstal, Robert (1905) Histoire de la légitimation des infantes naturales en droit 
canonique. Paris: E. Lourex. 
Godolphin, John (1687) Reportorium Canonicum, 3d ed.  London: Assigns of R. & E. 
Atkins.  
Hartley, Shirley (1975) Illegitimacy. Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California 
Press. 
Helmholz, R.H. (1969) “Bastardy Litigation in Medieval England,” American Journal of 
Legal History 13:360-83. 
Helmholz, R.H. (1977) “Support Orders, Church Courts, and the Rule of Filius Nullius: A 
Reassessment of the Common Law,” Virginia Law Review 63:431-48. 
Hendrix, Lewellyn (1996) Illegitimacy and Social Structures. Westport, CT:  Bergin & 
Garvey.  
Jackson, Mark (1996) New-Born Child Murder: Women, Illegitimacy, and the Courts in 
Eighteenth-Century England.  Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Jackson, Timothy P. (1999) Love Disconsoled: Meditations on Christian Charity. 
Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press. 
James, T.E. (1957) “The Illegitimate and Deprived Child: Legitimation and Adoption,” in 
A Century of Family Law: 1857-1957. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 39-55. 
Kent, James (1827) Commentaries on American Law, 2 vols. New York: O. Halsted.  
Krause, Harry D. (1971) Illegitimacy: Law and Social Policy. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-
Merrill Company, Inc. 
Laslett, Peter (1977) The Family and Illicit Love in Early Generations. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Laslett, Peter et al., eds. (1980) Bastardy and its Comparative History: Studies in the 
History of Illegitimacy and Marital Non-Conformism in Britain, France, Germany, 
Sweden, North America, Jamaica, and Japan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Mackin, Theodor (1982) Marriage in the Catholic Church: What is Marriage?  New York: 
Paulist Press. 
 21 
Malinowski, Bronislaw (1962) Sex, Culture, and Myth.  New York: Harcourt, Brace & 
World. 
Popenoe, David and Barbara DaFoe Whitehead (1998-2000). The State of our Unions.  
Rutgers, NJ: National Marriage Project. 
Post, Stephen G. (2000) More Lasting Unions: Christianity, the Family, and Society.  
Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. 
Presser, Stephen B. (1971) “The Historical Background of the American Law of 
Adoption,” Journal of Family Law 11:443-516 
Reekie, Gail (1998) Measuring Immorality: Social Inquiry and the Problem of 
Legitimacy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Rose, Lionel (1986) The Massacre of the Innocents: Infanticide in Britain 1800-1939.  
London/Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Schaberg, Jane (1997) The Illegitimacy of Jesus.  San Francisco: Harper & Row. 
Schmugge, Ludwig et al., eds (1994) Illegitimität im Spätmittelalter.  Munich: R. 
Oldenbourg Verlag.   
Teichman, Jenny (1982) Illegitimacy: An Examination of Bastardy.  Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press.  
Thomas, Mason P. (1972) “Child Abuse and Neglect.  Part I: Historical Overview, Legal 
Matrix, and Social Perspectives,” North Carolina Law Review 50:293-349. 
Tierney, Brian (1959) Medieval Poor Law: A Sketch of Canonical Theory and its 
Application in England. Berkeley/ Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959. 
Witte, John, Jr. (1997) From Sacrament to Contract: Marriage, Religion, and Law in the 
Western Tradition.  Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press. 
Witte, John, Jr. (2002) Law and Protestantism: The Legal Teachings of the Lutheran 
Reformation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Zainaldin, Jamil S. (1979) “The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law: Child 
Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-1851,” Northwestern Law Review 73:1038-89 
Zingo, Martha T. and Kevin E. Early (1994) Nameless Persons: Legal Discrimination 
Against Non-Marital Children in the United States.  Westport, CT: Praeger.  
